An Analysis of “The Bignetti Model”
Keywords:
The Bignetti Model, Free-will illusion, Consciousness, Personal identity (PI), Action-decision mechanism, Voluntary action, Probabilistic-deterministic brain, Trials-and-errors strategy, Cause-and-effect lawAbstract
Most people believe in the freedom of their will, so they are convinced to decide their own voluntary actions, without being controlled by God, fate, or circumstances. Though, the cognitive success of a learning curve depends on a statistical correlation between the prior experience and the posterior effect. Since long ago, several scientific pieces of evidence denied the existence of free-will (FW). Our scientific work contributed to corroborating the idea that FW might be an illusion of the mind; then, the belief that our conscious mind might exhibit decisional ability without any form of external control, is nonsense. Since that, we may exclude that our conscious mind could host a “soul-inhabited self” or a “ghost of the machine”; if anything, it could host a sort of witness with a specific critical sense towards incoming experiences. Then, the intriguing question was how the mind could anyway exhibit cognition and behavior. Our answer was that our mind emerges from the brain as a probabilistic-deterministic computational machine with a self-oriented, cognitive, autopoietic purpose; to this aim, a virtual Ego-FW binomial is genetically installed in the mind in place of a real, concrete, independent Ego-FW binomial. According to psychophysical “push-no-push” experiments, we observed that learning curves show classic Bayesian behavior, i.e. the positive experience of a trial will ameliorate the further one. Then, we concluded that the action decision mechanism is elaborated by a computational mechanism genetically installed in the brain of all people, while the experience gained in everyday life is the epigenetic force that modifies the memory archive, thus contributing to shaping personal identity (PI). The 1st-person perspective (1PP) and the 3rd-person perspective (3PP) play a crucial role in these processes. 1PP is the emotive, subjective side of the conscious mind; it deludes to decide and control the actions according to the freedom of its will but it may move around only as an avatar in a virtual game. On the contrary, 3PP is the objective and rational perspective of the conscious mind; it works as an external witness of the constrained activity of 1PP. Obviously, while reacting in response to a stimulus, the subject is on the 1PP side of the conscious mind; thus, she/he cannot accept the idea that FW might be an illusion; paradoxically, the false belief in FW is the necessary condition of the mind to get the best cognition and behavior. In conclusion, we have investigated these mechanisms of human cognition and behaviour in over 20-years of work; in the meanwhile, we have elaborated “The Bignetti Model”, a human cognitive model compatible with these results.
References
Bignetti E. Vie sensoriali e soft-brain. Ann. Fac. Medic. Vet. di Parma. 1994; 14: 65-95.
Bignetti E. Dissacrazione Della Coscienza. Firenze, Italy: Il Valico Edizioni; 2001.
Bignetti E. Cervello e mente: Ovvero casualità e determinismo. Ann. Fac. Medic. Vet. di Parma. 2003; 23: 69-78.
Bignetti E. Consciousness can learn but cannot decide. Ann. Fac. Medic. Vet. di Parma. 2004; 24: 31-52.
Bignetti E. Free will is the illusionary by-product of self-percep-tion. Paper presented at: 4th International Nonlinear Science Con-ference of “The Society for Chaos Theory in Psychology and Life Science”; 2010; Palermo, Sicily, Italy.
Bignetti E. Ego and free will: A virtual binomial apt for cogni-tion. Paper presented at: Neural Plasticity and Cognitive Modifia-bility; 2013; Jerusalem, Israel.
Bignetti E. The functional role of free-will illusion in cognition: The bignetti model. Cognitive Systems Research. 2014; 32: 45-60. doi: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2014.04.001
Bignetti E. From brain to mind: A plain route from neurobi-ology to psychology. Psychol Cogn Sci Open J. 2015; 1: 15-25. doi: 10.17140/PCSOJ-1-103
Bignetti E, Martuzzi F, Tartabini A. A psychophysical approach to test: The bignetti model. Psychol Cogn Sci Open J. 2016; 3: 24-35. doi: 10.17140/PCSOJ-3-121
Bignetti E. Which is necessary for cognition, free will or free will illusion? Psychol Cogn Sci Open J. 2017; 3: 116-122. doi: 10.17140/ PCSOJ-3-133
Bignetti E. New insights into “The Bignetti Model” from clas-sic and quantum mechanics perspectives. Psychol Cogn Sci Open J. 2018; 4: 24-35. doi: 10.17140/PCSOJ-4-140
Aimi A, Martuzzi F, Bignetti E. Rational curves modelling psychophysical tests data: A computational approach compatible with TBM cognitive model. Far East Journal of Mathematical Sciences (FJMS). 2018; 1: 81-108. doi: 10.17654/MS107010081 Bignetti E, et al
Bignetti E. May conscious mind give a “Scientific Definition” of consciousness? Open Journal of Philosophy. 2019; 9: 439-451. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2019.94027
Bignetti E. IL Binomio “Coscienza-Libero Arbitrio” È Un’Illusione Vincente (Italian Edition) Kindle Edition. 2019b.
Bignetti E. “Dual state”, “Double-perspective” and “Carte-sian-like dualism” are three forms of dualisms emerging in mind like in a matrioska. Open Journal of Philosophy. 2020; 10: 555-578. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2020.104039
Bignetti E. The limits of mind and “The Bignetti Model”. New Horizons in Education and Social Studies. 2021; 9: 85-97. doi: 10.9734/ bpi/nhess/v9/7239D
Bignetti E. We are the avatars of ourselves. Int J Psychol Behav Anal. 2021; 7: 180-194. doi: 10.15344/2455-3867/2021/180
Baars BJ. Metaphors of consciousness and attention in the brain. Trends in Neurosciences. 1998; 21: 58-62. doi: 10.1016/S0166- 2236(97)01171-5
Atkinson AP, Thomas MS, Cleeremans A. Consciousness: Mapping the theoretical landscape. Trends Cogn Sci. 2000; 4: 372- 382. doi: 10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01533-3
Wegner DM. The Illusion of Conscious Will. MA, USA: Massa-chussetts Institute of Technology; 2002.
Chalmers DJ. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Jour-nal of Consciousness Studies. 1995; 2(3): 200-219.
Chalmers DJ. The Conscious Mind. NY, USA: Oxford University Press; 1996.
Dennett DC. Consciousness Explained. NY, USA: Hachette Book Group USA. 1992.
Dennett DC. The self as the center of narrative gravity. In: Kessel F, Cole PM, Johnson DL, eds. Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. London, England, UK: Psychology Press; 1992b: 103- 114.
Dennett DC. Explaining the magic of consciousness. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology. 2003; 1 (1): 7-19.
Dennett DC. Freedom Evolves. NY, USA: Viking Press; 2003.
Dennett DC. “My brain made me do it” (when neuroscientists think can do philosophy). 2011. Web site. https://cadmus.eui.eu/ handle/1814/16895. Accessed June 30, 2022.
Baars B, Gage N. Fundamentals of Cognitive Neuroscience. Cam-bridge, MA, USA. Academic Press; 2012.
Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries. Web site. https://www.ox-fordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/free-will?q=-free+will. Accessed June 30, 2022.
Libet B. Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness potential): the unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain. 1983; 106: 623-642. doi: 10.1093/ brain/106.3.623
Libet B. Mind time: The temporal factor in consciousness. In: Perspectives in Cognitive Neuroscience. MA, USA: Harvard University Press; 2004.
Soon CS, Brass M, Heinze HJ, Haynes JD. Unconscious deter-minants of free decisions in the human brain. Nat Neurosci. 2008; 11: 543-545. doi: 10.1038/nn.2112
Matsuhashi M, Hallett M. The timing of the conscious intention to move. Eur J Neurosci. 2008; 28: 2344-2351. doi: 10.1111/j.1460- 9568.2008.06525.x
Shepherd J. Free will and consciousness: Experimental studies. Conscious Cogn. 2012; 21: 915-927. doi: 10.1016/j.con-cog.2012.03.004
Nichols S. Experimental philosophy and the problem of free will. Science. 2011; 331: 1401-1403. doi: 10.1126/science.1192931
Schroedinger E. Indeterminism and free will. Nature. 1936; 1(38): 13-14. doi: 10.1038/138013a0
Schurger A, Sitt JD, Dehaenne S. An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2012; 109(42): E2904-E2913. doi: 10.1073/ pnas.1210467109
Bignetti E. Recent Advances in Clinical Evaluation & Man-agement of Sleep Apnoea. Paper presented at: the International Conference on Integrated Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology. De-cember 3-4 2012; Agra, UP, India.
Bignetti E. Discovering novel technologies to boost treatment of neurological complications. Paper present at: the International Conference on Neuroscience and Psychiatry; November 8-9, 2021. Vienna, Austria.
Deco G, Rolls ET, Romo R. Stochastic dynamics as a principle of brain functions. Prog Neurobiol. 2009; 88(1): 1-16. doi: 10.1016/j. pneurobio.2009.01.006
Das S. A comparison of modern science with Vedic science. Research and Science Today. 2019; 1: 143-168. 18 Bignetti E, et al
Hertwig R, Barron G, Weber EU, Erev I. Decisions from ex-perience and the rare events in risky choice. Psychol Sci. 2004; 15(8): 534-539. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00715.x
Ebbinghaus H. A contribution to experimental psychology. Ann Neurosci. 2013; 20(4): 155-156. doi: 10.5214/ans.0972.7531.200408
Hall GS, Titchener EB. The American Journal of Psychology. IL, USA: University of Illinois Press; 1903.
Bryan WL, Harter N. Studies on the telegraphic language: the acquisition of a hierarchy of habits. Psychology Review. 1899; 6: 345- 375. doi: 10.1037/h0073117
Starkes JL, Allard F. Cognitive issues in motor expertise. Adv. Psychol. 1993; 102: 75-94.
Bayes T, Price R. An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chance. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 1763; 53: 370-418. doi: 10.1098/rstl.1763.0053
Bayes T. Essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chance. Biometrika. 1958; 45: 293-315.
Jovanovic B, Nyarko Y. A Bayesian learning model fitted to a variety of empirical learning curves. Brookings Institution Press. 1995; 247-305. doi: 10.2307/2534775
Koch C. Biophysics of Computation. Oxford, NY, USA: Oxford University Press; 1999.
Halligan PW, Oakley DA. Giving up on consciousness as the ghost in the machine. Front Psychol. 2021; 12: 571460. doi: 10.3389/ fpsyg.2021.571460
Maturana HR, Varela FJ. Autopoiesis and cognition: The Realiza-tion of the Living. MA, USA: Springer Dordrecht; 1980: 146. doi: 10.1007/978-94-009-8947-4
Maturana H, Varela F. The Tree of Knowledge. Boston, MA, USA: 1998.
Kohlberg L. From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fal-lacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development. NY, USA: Academic Press; 1971.
Kohlberg L. Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy of Moral Development. San Francisco, CA, USA: Harper & Row; 1981.
Haggbloom SJ, Warnick R, Warnick JE, et al. “The 100 most eminent psychologists of the 20th century”. Review of General Psy-chology. 2002; 6(2): 139-152. doi: 10.1037//1089-2680.6.2.139
Kohlberg L. From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fal-lacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development. NY, USA: Academic Press; 1971.
Kohlberg L. Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy of Moral Development. San Francisco, CA, USA: Harper & Row; 1981.
Colby A, Damon W. “The development of extraordinary moral commitment”. In: Killen M, Hart D, eds. Morality in Everyday Life: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 1999.
Auger WF, Rich SJ. Curriculum Theory and Methods: Perspectives on Learning and Teaching. Mississauga, Ontario, Canada: John Wiley & Sons Canada; 2007.
Gazzaniga M. Who is in charge? BioScience. 2011; 61: 937-938. doi: 10.1525/bio.2011.61.12.2
Gazzaniga MS. Free will is an illusion but you are still responsi-Bignetti E, et al ble for your actions. 2012. Web site. https://www.chronicle.com/ article/free-will-is-an-illusion-but-youre-still-responsible-for-your-actions/#:~:text=Michael%20S.,Still%20Responsible%20for%20 Your%20Actions. Accessed June 30, 2022.
Morawetz T. The Philosophy of Law: An Introduction. NJ, USA: Prentice Hall; 1980.
Kahn PH. Children’s obligatory and discretionary moral judg-ments. Child Dev. 1992; 63: 416-430.
Greene J, Haidt J. How (and where) does moral judgment work. Trends Cogn Sci. 2002; 6: 517-523. doi: 10.1016/s1364- 6613(02)02011-9
Freud S. Civilization and its Discontent. NY, USA: W. W. Norton Company; 1929. Psychol Cogn Sci Open J. 2025; 11(1): 9-20.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
All content published in Psychology and Cognitive Sciences (PCS) is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). This license allows anyone to copy, distribute, transmit, and adapt the work — including for commercial purposes — provided appropriate credit is given to the original author(s) and source.
